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Abstract 
Experimental investigations of non-expected utility have primarily concentrated on decision under risk Uprob- 
ability triangles"). The literature suggests, however, that ambiguity is one of the main causes for deviations from 
expected utility (EUt. This article investigates the descriptive performance of rank-dependent utility (RDU) in 
the context of choice under ambiguity. We use the axiomatic difference between RDU and EU to critically test 
RDU against EU. Surprisingly, the RDU model does not provide any descriptive improvement over EU. Our data 
suggest other "framing" factors that do provide descriptive improvements over EU. 
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In the past decades, students of individual choice have demonstrated that preference 
behavior deviates from Expected Utility theory (EU). In response, various generalizations 
and alternatives toEU have been put forward. Axioms that are thought to be descriptively 
invalid have been weakened to accommodate the observed violations. For most theorists, 
the independence axiom is the major culprit, exemplified by the Allais and Ellsberg 
paradoxes. In the early 1980s, several new models have been proposed that weaken the 
independence axiom, thus generalizing EU. Two major kinds of transitive generalizations 
have emerged: betweenness models and rank-dependent models. 
Recently, empirical research is cumulating that tests whether the new proposals are able 
to explain the experimental facts found thus far (Camerer and Ho, 1994). Most of this 
research can be summarized using so-called probability triangles. These triangles employ 
three outcomes that are kept constant. Gambles are constructed by varying the probabili- 
ties assigned to these outcomes. Most of the theories considered can be tested by observ- 
ing preference behavior on selected pairs of gambles from these triangles. The overall 
picture emerging from this research is that none of the generalized expected utility theo- 
ries can explain all the systematic violations that have been discovered. The betweenness 
condition, for example, is found to be systematically violated (Camerer and Ho, 1994). 
The rank-dependent models (RDU), especially the new version of prospect theory, Cu- 
mulative Prospect heory, are at the moment probably the leading contender for best 
descriptive theory. However, some remarks must be made. 
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First, several phenomena cannot be explained by the rank-dependent models. For in- 
stance, it turns out that the shapes of indifference curves in probability triangles are not 
independent of the amounts of money that are used, whereas they should be, according to 
RDU. Second, to reach conclusions, most experiments done thus far assume other axioms, 
such as transitivity and reduction, axioms that are also necessary for RDU. It is not always 
evident that he reported violations of EU are due to violations of the independence axiom 
rather than violations of the assumed axioms. (An exception is Camerer and Ho (1994), 
who did verify that their observed violations of betweenness were not due to violations of 
transitivity.) 
Third, and perhaps most important, most of the research conducted thus far is not very 
well-suited for testing rank-dependent models. In probability triangles, outcomes are kept 
constant and probabilities are varied. Because RDU theories introduce the weighting of 
probabilities, they are especially well-suited for handling variations in probability, and 
therefore impose few testable predictions on the probability triangle. Theories that do not 
assume a probability weighting function are tested more strictly in the triangle. It can be 
shown (Wakker, Erev, and Weber, 1994, Observation 3) that it is not possible to test RDU 
conclusively with stimuli that employ only three outcomes, as is done in probability 
triangles. Another problem with probability triangles is that they can only be used to test 
theories for decision under isk, not for decision under ambiguity. It is not a priori true that 
results concerning EU generalizations in the risky case can be extrapolated to the am- 
biguous case. 
Wakker (1996) outlines a test that provides a precise empirical demarcation between 
RDU and EU. This test avoids the complications described above and will be discussed in 
detail shortly. Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994) employed the test in a risky setting and 
found a negative result. That is, there was no evidence that people were sensitive to rank 
dependence in the context of risk. Thus, it appears that RDU also faces some serious 
descriptive shortcomings in the risky case. 
This article studies the descriptive performance of RDU for decision under ambiguity. 
Outcomes are not generated with given probabilities, but depend on events with unknown 
probabilities generated by irregular dice. Although people rarely encounter decision situ- 
ations where probabilities are known, nearly all experimental studies of decision making 
have concentrated on risk. (For a review of exceptions, ee Camerer and Weber, 1992.) 
Therefore, little is known about he descriptive success of generalized EU and RDU under 
ambiguity. There are, however, several reasons why RDU can be expected to be more 
useful for ambiguity than for risk. This is explained next. 
RDU generalizes EU by permitting decision weights to depend not only on events but 
also on outcomes. More precisely, the decision weights are affected by the rank ordering 
of the outcomes. This outcome dependence of decision weights can have more effect 
under ambiguity than under risk, because, under ambiguity, it will not only affect the 
weight of given probabilities in decisions but also the preceding assessment of such 
probabilities or likelihoods. ~Hence weighting functions can be expected to exhibit more 
nonadditivity in ambiguity. Weber (1994) describes uncertainty concerning probability as 
the primary source for outcome dependence. In the normative model of Schmeidler 
(l 989) that initiated the rank-dependent model for ambiguity, it was explicitly assumed 
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that nonadditivity was only due to ambiguity and not to risk. Further, Tversky and Fox 
(1995) found more pronounced nonadditivity for ambiguity than for risk in an empirical 
study. These observations suggest that RDU can be a powerful theory for decision under 
ambiguity, and they motivate the experiment of this article. 
Let us point out one restriction concerning the results of our study. One of the main 
conclusions of recent experimental research in decision theory is that framing and pre- 
sentation have a large impact on observed ecisions. In our experiment, we chose the, in 
our opinion, most basic binary choice tasks, and our stimuli are relatively simple and 
transparent. Therefore, the common outcomes in our stimuli were transparent. An inter- 
esting question is to what degree the results of our study can be affected by different 
presentations of the stimuli, in particular, if those presentations conceal common out- 
comes. This question has been studied in further detail by Weber and Kirsner (1995) and 
is discussed in section 4 below. 
1. Testing RDU: the theoretical design of the experiment 
In decision theory, preferences are taken as the observable primitives of the theory, and 
theories are ultimately characterized by axioms defined on these preferences. The central 
axiom of decision under ambiguity as formulated by Savage (1954) is the sure-thing 
principle2: If two gambles hare an event hat yields the same outcome, then this common 
outcome should not matter for the decision. That is, subjects hould behave as if they 
"cancel" the common outcome prior to making their choice. Consequently, the preference 
between these gambles hould not be affected if we change the common outcome. 
It can be shown that the essential difference between RDU and EU comes down to a 
weakening of the sure-thing principle (STP) to the case where the gambles are "comono- 
tonic." All other differences between EU and RDU are, in a way, nonessential (for a 
precise formulation see Wakker, 1996). Two gambles are comonotonic f they induce the 
same order on the events according to the favorability of the outcomes. This condition will 
be explained by an example, also introducing the kind of stimuli that were used in the 
experiment. 
Figure 1 presents two gambles. Amounts are Dutch guilders 151 equals about F1 1.65). 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Gamble R 2 7 12 
Gamble S 3 5 1 2 
FTgure l. Two gambles, R and S. Common outcome quals 12. 
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The gamble with the larger spread of outcomes i denoted by R (risky), the other one by 
S (safe). For gamble R, the best outcome, 12, is obtained under event 3. Event 2 yields the 
second best outcome, 7, and Event 1 the worst outcome, 2. The same order of the events 
is induced by the rank-order of the outcomes of gamble S, as is easily verified. If we 
construct two gambles R' and S' on the same events (figure 2), by changing the common 
outcome on event 3 from $12 to $8, then this pair of gambles is again comonotonic. 
Moreover, the change of the common outcome does not change the rank order in 
comparison to the original gambles. Therefore, any pair of these four gambles is comono- 
tonic; they all induce the same rank ordering on the events. In this case, where all gambles 
are pairwise comonotonic, the comonotonic STP applies. It forbids a preference r versal 
for the choices in figure 1 and 2: only the preferences R and R' or the preferences S and 
S' are allowed. 
Next consider a change of the common outcome from 8 to 4 (figure 3). Now Event 2 
has become the best event instead of Event 3. In this case, the gambles R" and S" induce 
a different rank ordering on events than the gambles R' and S'. The four gambles are not 
pairwise comonotonic, therefore the comonotonic STP does not apply. RDU now allows 
each of the four possible patterns of preferences. The choices in figures 2 and 3 provide 
a test of the STP that will be called non-comonotonic. 
If the axiomatic difference between EU and RDU lies in the difference between the STP 
and the comonotonic STP, then the critical empirical test of RDU is to compare the 
violation rate of the STP with the violation rate of the comonotonic STP. If RDU has any 
additional value to EU, then there must be systematic violations of the non-comonotonic 
STP. Consequently, the violation rate of the non-comonotonic STP should then be higher 
than the violation rate of the comonotonic STP. The main goal of the experiment is to test 
this hypothesis. 
An additional part of the design introduces tests of RDU in combination with particular 
weighting functions. The explanation of these tests is more formal and is described next. 
First we introduce some notation. The RDU value of a gamble yielding X~ if event E i (i = 
1, 2, 3) occurs can be written as: 
wiU(Xl) + ~2U(X2) + w3U(X3), (1) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Gamble R' 2 7 8 
Gamble S' 3 5 8 
Figure 2. Common outcome equals 8. 












Figure 3. Common outcome quals 4. 
where the ~r's are the "decision weights" (and subscripts refer to events). They depend on 
the rank order of the outcomes. If X~ -> X 2 -> X3, the decision weights are defined as 
follows: 
71 = W(E1), 'rr 2 = W(E l U E 2) - W(E I) and w3 = 1 - W(E 1 U E2); 
here, W is the weighting function. W assigns value 1 to the universal event, value 0 to the 
impossible vent, and satisfies W(A) -> W(B) whenever A contains B. 
We can now demonstrate formally that RDU cannot explain a change of preference if 
the common outcome changes from 8 to 12, as discussed above. The change from 8 to 12 
does not affect he rank ordering of outcomes; hence the decision weights do not change. 
One easily verifies that preferences cannot hen reverse. 3 This proves that RDU implies 
the comonotonic STP. Next we consider tests of the non-comonotonic STP Here the 
general RDU model does not impose restrictions, for decision weights can change and no 
conclusions can be drawn. 
If we specify characteristics of the weighting function, however, additional restrictions 
are implied. We derive these restrictions using again the example from the experiment. 
First we discuss the change of common outcome from 0 to 4, next from 4 to 8. Suppose 
a subject prefers R" to S" in the choice question depicted in figure 4. This implies that the 
RDU value of R" exceeds the RDU value of S'": 
wlU(2) + 'n'2U(7 ) + 'n'3U(0 ) > rrlU(3) + ~r2U(5) + 7r3U(0), 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Gamble R'" 2 7 0 
Gamble S'" 3 5 0 
Figure 4. Common outcome quals O. 
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where the decision weights "rrt, ~r2, and ~r 3 are next explained. For R" and S" ,  the highest 
outcome is obtained under event E2; therefore its decision weight "rr~ is W(E2). Event E t 
yields the second highest outcome; therefore 7r 1 is W(E I U E2) - W(E2). Finally, event 
E 3 yields the worst outcome; therefore "rr 3 is 1 - W(E t U E2). The above formula can be 
rewritten as: 
~2[U(7) - U(5) 2> "rc,[W(3) - U(2)]. (2) 
If we change the outcome from 0 to 4 (figure 3), Event 1 becomes the worst event. 
Suppose that, in this case, the same subject prefers S" to R", implying a violation of  the 
non-comonotonic STP Now the RDU value of S" exceeds the RDU value of R": 
11"2'[O(7 ) -- U(5)] < "rr, '[U(3) - U(2)], (3) 
where ~r 1 ' = 1 - W(E 2 L) E3) and "tr 2' = W(E2) (='rr2). This pattern of preferences does 
not constitute a violation of RDU, for it can be explained ifw~ in (2) is smaller than wj' 
in (3), so if 
W(E l UE  2) -  W(E2)< 1 - W(E 2 UE3). 
A weighting function W is concave  if for all disjoint events A,B,D, 
W(A U B) - W(B) - -  W(A U B U D) - W(B U D). 
That is, the marginal weight contribution of Event B (i.e., its decision weight) becomes 
smaller if Event A is enlarged to AUD. A convex  function is defined similarly, with the 
reversed inequality; so then the marginal weight contribution of Event B to Event A is 
increasing in A. I f  we substitute E l for A, E 2 for B, and E 3 for D, then it follows that a 
concave weighting function cannot explain the stated inequality. Thus, RDU in combina- 
tion with a concave weighting function cannot explain the above preferences. RDU com- 
bined with a convex weighting function can explain these preferences, for it predicts that 
wl in (2) is smaller than or equal to wl' in (3). Convexity of the weighting function can 
be interpreted as modeling pessimism. A pessimistic subject predominantly looks at the 
worst outcome. In figure 4, the common outcome of 0 is the lowest outcome, so Event 3 
receives much attention. I f  we change the common outcome from 0 to 4, Event 1 becomes 
the worst event and receives more attention than before. Under Event 1, the risky gamble 
yields 2; whereas the subject receives a better outcome, 3, if he chooses the safe gamble. 
Therefore, the change of the common outcome from 0 to 4 enhances the safe choice, in 
agreement with the predictions of RDU with a convex weighting function. 
I f  we change the common outcome from 4 to 8 (figure 3 and figure 2), the common 
outcome becomes the best outcome. I fW is convex, Event 2 will receive a larger decision 
weight than before. In this case, the risky choice is enhanced, for the risky gamble yields 
a larger outcome on Event 2 than does the safe gamble. Thus, RDU with a convex 
weighting function cannot model a preference for the gamble R" in figure 3 combined 
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with a preference for the gamble S' after the change of the common outcome to 8. RDU 
with a concave weighting function precludes the reversed change of preference. 
In cumulative prospect theory, the weighting function is S shaped. For decision weights, 
this implies that, for good outcomes and for bad outcomes, decision weights in cumulative 
prospect heory are relatively large. Middle outcomes receive relatively small decision 
weights. Recapitulating, we can say that, for a convex weighting function, the low out- 
comes receive more attention (pessimism); for a concave weighting function, the high 
outcomes receive more attention (optimism); and for cummulative prospect heory, the 
extreme outcomes receive more attention. Table 1 summarizes all additional restrictions 
that RDU combined with a particular weighting function imposes on our data. 
2. The experiment 
The experiment was conducted with 60 undergraduate students at the University of 
Nijmegen, most of whom were majoring in psychology. They were paid according to the 
random lottery method (see Starmer and Sugden, 1991, for comments on its reliability): 
one of the choice questions was randomly selected at the end, and the choice of the 
subjects was played out. Besides the lottery, yielding maximally F! 15 (about $9) and 
minimally nothing, the subjects all received F1 3 for their participation. All preferences 
were administrated by computer, including the response times. 
The ambiguous events were generated by three different irregular dice. Each die had six 
different sides, which were grouped into three events by different colors. Colors are used 
to label and identify events, i.e., "red" denotes the event hat the die lands red side down. 
(This unusual way of "reading" the event from a die simplified the estimation of prob- 
abilities: larger sides are more probable than smaller ones.) Subjects received no frequen- 
tistic information about he dice: they were encouraged toexamine the dice, but they were 
not allowed to throw them. We ran an independent experiment (n = 10), to get an 
impression of the perceived likelihoods of the events generated by the dice. The results are 
reported in table 2. 
Two gambles were constructed on the events, called S and R in this article, shorthand 
for safe and risky. The subjects were asked to state which of the two gambles they would 
prefer to play if they were given the opportunity to play one of them. No indifferences 
were allowed. 
Table 1. Patterns of violations of the non-comonotonic STP (i.e., changes of preference) that contradict RDU 
combined with a weighting function as specified in the columns. Opposite changes can be explained. 
rank order of  common outcome cumulative 
event changes from: Convex Concave prospect heory 
worst --* middle S --~ R R --~ S S --~ R 
middle ---, best R ~ S S ---, R S ~ R 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations (SD) of the perceived likelihoods. 
Die I Die 11 Die III 
White Yellow Grey Green Blue Red Purple Green  Yellow 
Mean 0.099 0.242 0.659 0.135 0.186 0.679 0.311 0.304 0.384 
SD 0.029 0.071 0.075 0.071 0.072 0.113 0.031 0.031 0.041 
The test consisted of 36 choice questions. The order of these choice questions was 
randomized. Three choice questions were replicated in the experiment. These were ran- 
domly selected and varied from one subject to the other. The replications were added to 
provide some indication of the consistency of the subjects. We also included nine filler 
items, where one gamble was clearly superior to the other (for any reasonable stimate of 
the likelihoods of the events). The filler items were included in order to motivate subjects 
to consider their choices carefully. Also, these fillers helped to prevent recognition, and 
successfully so, according to the pilot study (21 subjects, written evaluation). The test was 
preceded by twelve training questions to avoid learning effects during the test. 
The stimuli were chosen according to a number of criteria. The gambles had to be close 
in preference, because we wanted to leave room for changes in preference due to changes 
in the common outcome. For all choice problems, we included a small risk premium. All 
outcomes were positive to exclude sign effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
We constructed nine quadruples of choice questions that were the same except for a 
change of a common outcome. The quadruples are called sets henceforth, and are denoted 
by A,..., I (see tables 3-5). For example, the safe gamble in the first gamble pair of set A, 
denoted by (2, White; 2, Yellow; 0, Grey), yields 2 if die I lands white down, 2 if die I 
lands yellow down, and 0 if die I lands grey down. The risky gamble in the first gamble 
pair of set A is (0, White; 3, Yellow; 0, Grey). The other three gamble pairs of set A are 
the same, except that the common outcome for grey is replaced by another common 
outcome (2,4, and 6, respectively). The other sets in tables 3,4, and 5 are defined similarly, 
but table 4 referes to die II, and table 5 to die III. Set G of table 5 was already illustrated 
in figures 1-4. 
For comparability, we always changed the common outcome by the same amount. One 
change of the common outcome yielded a test of the comonotonic STR the other two 
changes provided tests of the non-comonotonic STP 
Table 3. Sets of gambles generated by die 1. The underlined common outcomes yield gamble pairs that provide 
a test of the comonotonic STP. 
Set of gambles S/R White Yellow Grey (Common outcome) 
Sa~ 2 2 A 0 2 4 6 Risky 0 3 
Safe 10 10 B 0 5 10 15 Risky 5 12 _ _ 
Sa~ 4 9 C 0 4 8 12 Risky 0 11 
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Table 4. Sets of gambles generated by die 11, 
Set of gambles S/R Green Blue Red (Common outcome) 
Safe 5 5 
D 1 3 5 7 
Risky 7 4 - - 
Safe 2 8 
E 0 4 8 12 
Risky 0 12 _ _ 
Safe 2 3 
F 0 3 6 9 
Risky 0 6 
Table 5. Sets of gambles generated by die 111. 
Set of gambles S/R Purple Green Yellow (Common outcomes) 
Safe 3 5 
G 0 4 8 12 
Risky 2 7 - I 
Safe 8 3 
H 0 4 8 12 
Risky 12 0 _ _ 
Safe 6 6 
1 0 3 6 9 
Risky 9 4 _ _ 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four different conditions concerning the 
presentation of the items. These conditions were included, because we wanted to control 
for artefacts due to presentation effects. 
The matrix condition presented the gambles in rows and the events in columns (figure 
5). The graphic condition presented colored two-dimensional "snapshots" of the die with 
the outcomes plotted on the sides (figure 6). 
The other two conditions were almost identical, both using a verbal description of the 
gambles. In the verbal condition, each gamble had a column that first stated the event 
followed by its outcome (figure 7a). The verbal-collapsed condition was the same, except 
that if two outcomes were the same, the events were grouped, for example, "White and 
Grey Side: FI 4" (figure 7b). For all conditions, the positioning (top/bottom) of the R and 
S gamble was randomized over subjects. 
Die l Whi te  Yellow Grey 
OptionA f 4 f 9 f 4 
Option B f 0 f 11 f 4 
Figure 5. The matrix condition. 
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A 
Die  I 
B 
Dio  I 
//7 
Figure 6. The graphic ondition. 
3.Results 
Our main hypothesis tates that if we change the common outcome, subjects will violate 
the STP less often if the change is comonotonic, then if it is non-comonotonic. The null 
hypothesis assumes, to the contrary, that comonotonicity has no effect, i.e., violations of 
the STP are as likely for non-comonotonic cases as for comonotonic ases. As all sets of 
White side: 4 
Yellow side: 9 
Grey side: 4 
White side: 0 
Yellow side: 11 
Grey side: 4 
I ....... I 
f-'--3 
Figure 7a. The verbal condition. 
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Figure 7b. The verbal-collapsed condition. 
items (A-I, tables 3-5) offered one comonotonic hange and two non-comonotonic 
changes of the common outcome, the null hypothesis predicts that in our data there will 
be twice as many violations of the non-comonotonic STP as of the comonotonic STP. 
The left half of table 6 shows that our expectation was invalidated. We found no effect 
of comonotonicity (p = .41, binomial). 
Some violations of the STP will be due to inconsistency on behalf of the subjects. A
comparison with the inconsistency rate of replications gives an indication if there are also 
systematic violations of EU. The null hypothesis tates that all violations are due to 
inconsistencies. If we take the variability between subjects into account, the null hypoth- 
esis cannot be rejected: the inconsistency rate of 0.283, and the violation rate of 0.264 are 
essentially equal in a paired comparison (t(59) = - .57, p = .714, one-tailed). It seems 
that observed violations of the STP should be explained by random inconsistencies of the 
subjects. The inconsistency rate of about 30% is not uncommon in choice experiments 
(Camerer, 1989). While strict inconsistency is a form of irrationality, in the case of our 
experiment there may be a more rational explanation for part of the observed inconsis- 
Table 6. Violations of the STP and violations of RDU, combined with a particular weighting function. 
Comono- Non-comono- Cumulative 
Condition tonic STP tonic STP STP Convex Concave prospect theory 
Matrix 24 55 79 27 28 28 
Verbal 36 70 106 42 28 39 
Graphic 30 73 103 37 36 39 
Collapsed 50 90 140 54 36 4 l 
Total 140 288 428 160 128 L47 
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tencies: The gambles were designed to be close in preference, so it could well be that 
subjects were more or less indifferent between several gambles and would then choose 
randomly. 
The design of the experiment also allowed us to investigate which functional forms of 
the weighting function performed best: convex, concave, or S-shaped. The results are 
presented in the right half of the table 6. RDU with a concave weighting function per- 
formed best. This is quite remarkable, as it deviates from common findings reported in 
other experimental papers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker, Erev and Weber, 1994; 
Wu, 1994) and is also contrary to our expectations that subjects would be ambiguity- 
averse for the kind of events which we employed. However, the difference between 
violation rates of concave and convex RDU are not significant if we take between-subject 
variability into account (t(59) = 1.51, p = .135). Besides, there is also reason to believe 
that the success of the concave functional can be partly explained by a side effect found 
in the verbal-collapsed condition, to which we will turn later. The patterns of preferences 
which we have found here also fall perfectly well within the range of what may be 
expected if violations of the STP are only random inconsistencies. 
We expected that there would be no large differences between the conditions, for all the 
conditions gave the same information i  a reasonably transparent manner. However, there 
were some significant differences, ummarized in table 7. 
There seems to be a significant and straightforward elation between the transparency 
of the presentation and the coherence and response time of the choices. The matrix 
condition, and, to a smaller degree, the verbal and graphic onditions, promote cancelling 
of the common outcome. Hence, we observe amuch smaller ate of violations of the STP 
here than in the verbal-collapsed condition, where common outcomes need not be trans- 
parently displayed. The inconsistency rate and response time are also much larger in the 
verbal-collapsed condition, indicating that the verbal-collapsed condition is more difficult, 
yielding more inconsistencies. 
The high rate of violations of the STP in the verbal-collapsed condition can also be 
partly explained by an interesting phenomenon that is due to collapsing. The collapsing 
effect asserts (in the context of gains) that if the common outcome collapses with an 
outcome of one of the gambles, then this gamble become less attractive. This biases 
violations of the STP, for, if there is a choice question where one gamble has an outcome 
that collapses with the common outcome, the collapsing effect predicts that subjects will 
be biased in favor of the gamble that has no collapse (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; 
Table Z Comparison of mean values. 
Violations of STP Inconsistencies 
Condition (Out of a possible 27) (Out of a possible 3) Mean time (sec) % Risky 
Matrix 5.27t 0.60 16.62 40.9 
Verbal 7.07 0.40t 18.66 41.5 
Graphic 6.87 I. 13" 16.92 41.3 
Verbal-Collapsed 9.33* 1.27" 21.97 46.5 
Within columns, t is significantly different from *, using Tukey's HSD at the .05 level. 
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Starmer and Sugden, 1989). The intuitive rationale for this effect seems to be that, because 
there are fewer distinct outcomes when there is a collapse, the gamble appears to be less 
attractive visually (see figure 6). A similar phenomenon is described in support heory 
(Tversky and Koehler, 1994), where "unpacking" an event enhances its perceived likeli- 
hood. 
If a gamble has only one outcome besides the common outcome (as happens in sets 
A,B,D, and I), then collapsing introduces a certain outcome, and a certainty effect (Kah- 
neman and Tversky, 1979) can be induced. In such cases, we cannot est for collapsing 
properly, because the certainty effect interferes. Therefore, collapses that introduce a 
certain outcome have been ignored in the analysis. 
We found significant collapsing effects in the verbal-collapsed condition. The collaps- 
ing effect predicts that there will be additional violations of the STP, because a gamble 
with a collapsed common outcome is less attractive. For each individual, the number of 
violations of the STP agreeing with the collapsing effect, and the number of violations 
disagreeing, were determined. A paired sample t-test showed a significant effect (t(14) = 
3.29, p < .01). The hypothesis that there is no difference between the direction of 
violations predicted by the collapsing effect between the verbal-collapsed condition and 
the other conditions could also be rejected (/'(1,58) = 8.70, p < .01). The finding of a 
collapsing effect suggests that subjects are more sensitive to seemingly innocuous and, 
according to EU, irrelevant variations in presentation than they are to comonotonicity. 
The program that administrated the choices also registered the response time. Although 
the experiment was not designed to test explicit hypotheses concerning response times, 
some points can be made. For instance, we observed that there were significant differences 
between mean response times on items constructed on the three different dice. 4 This 
indicates that subjects were sensitive to differences in the source of ambiguity. 
It is plausible to suppose a connection between strength of preference and response 
time. If the subject has a strong preference, he will find the choice problem easy and will 
answer quickly. If the subject is more or less indifferent between the two gambles, he will 
need more time to consider all relevant aspects of the available gambles. This is our main 
working hypothesis concerning response times. Given this hypothesis, we can investigate 
the explanation that part of the inconsistencies and thus part of the violations of the STP 
are caused by indifference. If subjects are indifferent between two gambles, the chance at 
violations of the STP and at violations of consistency on replications will increase. Hence, 
these chances will be positively correlated with response time. Table 8 shows that subjects 
indeed used significantly more response time for the inconsistent choices. 5 
Table 8. Mean response times (in seconds) and the probability ofobtaining these differences (or larger), on the 
assumption that mean times are equal. 
Violating pairs Verifying pairs Significance 
Test of consistency 21.74 18.18 .045 
Test of STP 21.57 17.93 .000 
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We also investigated which factors determine the response times of individual items. 
Most of the variance (25%) could be explained by differences between subjects (predict- 
ing a response time by the mean of the response times of the subject that gave the 
response). There are large differences between overall speed: the average time to make a 
choice was 18.5 seconds, with a large standard eviation of 6.4 seconds. Some of this 
variability (16%) can be explained by risk attitude. Subjects who are relatively risk-averse 
(more then 50% safe choices) are also relatively quick. This could point to the use of 
quick heuristics leading to safe choices. 
If we look at differences between items, we can also obtain predictive power concerning 
response time. The most predictive component, additional to within-subject differences, 
was the order of the item in the sequence (multiple regression, additional R 2 = .065, p < 
.01). At the beginning, subjects took much more time to answer a question than later on. 
In spite of a training session of twelve questions, we still found a strong learning effect. 
The second item characteristic that yields predictive power is, interestingly, the choice 
itself, i.e., whether the choice is risky or safe (additional R2 = .0065, p < .01). Given our 
working hypothesis, we might expect a curved relationship with its peak at the .5 risk 
percentage. We found, however, that, on the average, subjects take more time to give a 
risky than a safe choice. 6This may be explained by a justification process: it is easier to 
justify a safe then a risky choice. 
4. Discussion 
The test that we employed provides a critical test of rank-dependent utility. The experi- 
ment suggests that he general RDU model does not provide descriptive improvement over 
EU. We found no evidence that subjects are sensitive to comonotonicity for decision under 
ambiguity. The same was found for decision under risk by Wakker, Erev, and Weber 
(1994). 
Even if the general RDU model does not provide a descriptive improvement, more 
restrictive submodels may still be found that are of descriptive use. In that case, there will 
be relatively few violations of the non-comonotonic STP that are excluded by such a 
submodei (and relatively many that are permitted). In other words, the loss in accuracy is 
then outweighed by the gain in parsimony. Previous tudies have suggested that RDU with 
an S-shaped weighting function can be of interest (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wu and 
Gonzalez, 1994; Wakker, Erev, and Weber, 1994), and that the S-shape will be more 
pronounced for ambiguity than for risk (Tversky and Fox, 1995). Our experiment, how- 
ever, does not confirm these results. It seems that the data of this experiment could best 
be described as produced by a noisy EU-maximizer (Hey and Orme, 1994). 
Some dependencies onpresentation were apparent in our study. The different presen- 
tation modes that we used (in particular, the verbal-collapsed presentation) affected the 
rate of violations of the sure-thing principle to a significant degree. Not very surprisingly, 
consistency, and therefore violation rates of the STP, are affected by the complexity of 
presentation. The effect size that we found with seemingly trivial variation in presentation 
indicates a dependence of choice on presentation that is worrisome. Also, we found a 
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significant collapsing effect. That is, by presenting events with the same outcomes in a 
collapsed manner, the gamble becomes less attractive. This effect is not related to likeli- 
hood or outcomes, but to presentation ly, and is therefore difficult o accommodate in 
the present EU-like theories. 
By incorporating additional stages in decision theory that depend on the presentation f
the gambles and precede an EU- or RDU-like evaluation, we might be able to give a better 
description of preferences. First, a subadditive evaluation of collapsed events, decreasing 
the decision weight of such an event, can explain the collapse ffect. This process is very 
similar to the subadditive evaluation of"packed" hypotheses formalized in support heory 
(Tversky and Koehler, 1994). Second, we might introduce an editing operation where 
transparently coded common outcomes are cancelled (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
(Wu (1994) finds positive vidence for such an operation, while Li (1994) reports negative 
findings). This cancellation operation sheds a different light on our negative findings. If 
subjects always cancel common outcomes, RDU "cum cancellation" is untested by the 
current design. Additional stages in the theory, however, come at a price. They yield more 
descriptive qualities but weaken the elegance and the predictive power of the theory. 
The effects of variations in presentation modes on the performance of rank-dependent 
utility is a topic for further esearch. Weber and Kirsner (1995) addressed the question to 
what degree rank dependence can be enhanced by presentation. By highlighting the 
highest or the lowest outcome of the gambles, they enhanced optimistic and pessimistic 
choice making, respectively. Such modes of evaluation induce violations of the non- 
comonotonic STP. They also considered buying and selling tasks, where subjects can face 
losses so that loss-aversion effects can occur. This increases pessimism and therefore also 
induces rank dependency. Weber and Kirsner showed that these representational manipu- 
lations can generate significant rank dependence. 
Overall, our findings are negative. Taking EU and RDU as they have been axiomatized, 
we do not find evidence for rank dependency. We do think that RDU can be of descriptive 
value in specific domains of decision making. In our opinion, RDU yields an elegant 
manner for modeling preferences if the certainty or possibility effect applies. Also, multi- 
outcomes gambles can easily be too complicated to be evaluated in an EU-like style. It 
seems natural that in such cases people need to group outcomes to evaluate these gambles 
more easily (Lopes, 1987). A very likely grouping in best, worst, and intermediate out- 
come groups is essentially rank-dependent, providing high hopes for the descriptive suc- 
cess of RDU. The identification of special domains of application of RDU is a topic for 
future research. 
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Notes 
I. This interpretation is based in a two-stage approach to ambiguity. In the first stage, probabilities are 
estimated: in the second stage, they are transformed into decision weights. Both stages can generate 
non-additivity (two-factor model, Tversky and Fox, 1994, Tversky and Wakker, 1995), 
2. Combined with usual continuity assumptions, the STP is equivalent to independence for the context of risk 
(Fishburn and Wakker, 1995). 
3. Cancel common terms Ir3U(8 ) and Ir3U(12), respectively, in the RDU formula. 
4. Mean response times were 16.04 sec for die I, 19.68 sec for die II, and 21.21 sec for die III. The null 
hypothesis stating that mean times are equal could be rejected (F(2,58) = 35.73, p < .001 )). 
5. There is a risk of contamination here, due to the influence of base rates. Safe choices were more frequent, 
so there will be more consistent pairs of choices that are both safe. Mean response times for safe choices 
were also less than for risky choices. This implies that the response times of consistent pairs of choices will 
be less than for inconsistent pairs. However, the large base rate of safe choices cannot explain the magnitude 
of the differences reported. Based on the mean times and base rates for safe and risky choices, a mean time 
for consistent pairs of 18.88 sec is predicted, and a mean time of 19.33 sec for inconsistent pairs. 
6. Because the mean time of subjects was already entered as a predictor, the predictive value of the answer 
does not reflect differences between subjects but purely differences within subjects. 
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